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Abstract: 
Given a Monetary Union which is heterogeneous at the level of labour market 
flexibility, this paper studies the relative effectiveness of two fiscal policy games, i.e. Nash 
equilibrium and fiscal coordination in terms of macroeconomic stabilization.  
We will use a static Keynesian model within a closed Monetary Union and prove 
that the stabilization effectiveness depends mainly on the type and origin of the economic 
shocks affecting the Union members.  
Our results also point out that neither of the fiscal configurations succeeds in 
optimizing the macroeconomic stabilization of both the demand and supply shocks 
simultaneously for all the Union members.  
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1. Introduction  
The adoption of the euro has brought about a complete change of 
perspective on the coordination of economic policies within the Economic and 
Monetary Union. On the one hand, the two instruments acting against the country-
specific shocks that may affect the Union members, that is the interest rate and the 
exchange rate, have lost their autonomy. On the other hand, the game of economic 
policies will take place henceforth in a particular context: the single and centralized 
monetary policy, which is set up by an independent monetary authority (the 
European Central Bank), will interfere with several decentralized fiscal policies, and 
set up by the national governments. Within this original framework, a new debate 
arises: what is the impact of the fiscal policy coordination on the efficiency of the 
macroeconomic stabilization? 
The answers provided by the literature on the subject are rather 
contradictory because of the different theoretical frameworks used. Uhlig (2002) 
underlines the existence of a very clear specialization between the Central bank and 
the national governments: the Central bank stabilizes symmetrical supply shocks, 
whereas the governments deal with national demand shocks. As a result of this 
specialization, the conflict between public authorities will increase, having negative 
consequences on the macroeconomic equilibria. According to Uhlig, the solution 
relies on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact which sets up a form of 
coordination between governments. This solution allows a limitation of the public 
deficits of the Union members and avoids the implementation of an extremely 
binding monetary policy. 
Mundschenk and von Hagen (2003), while making the same assumption as 
Uhlig regarding the specialization between authorities, claim however that the fiscal 
policies are inefficient being limited exclusively to the use of automatic stabilizers, 
and that the Stability Pact can’t guarantee an efficient macroeconomic stabilization. 
They support the idea of an active coordination of the fiscal policies that can 
improve the efficiency of the macroeconomic stabilization compared to a non 
cooperative equilibrium. Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) defend the same idea and 
show that the informational power plays an essential part in the mechanisms of 
shock stabilization. Thus, the governments’ leadership improves the efficiency of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
At the same time, the effects of the fiscal policy coordination may differ 
according to the types of the shock affecting the economy. As shown by Beetsma, 
Debrun & Klaassen (2001), even if the fiscal policy coordination has a positive 
effect on asymmetric shocks’ stabilization, it may nevertheless prove to be 
counterproductive as regards symmetric shocks’ stabilization. This analysis is 
confirmed by Laskar (2003) who identifies an optimum degree of shock asymmetry 
at the level of which the fiscal coordination in a Monetary Union begins to be more 
efficient than in a flexible exchange rate system. However, Villieu (2000) states that 
on the contrary, with the enlargement of the Monetary Union, the fiscal coordination 
becomes less efficient if the degree of shock asymmetry grows. 
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These studies, like most of the literature dealing with the subject, are limited 
by the fact that they only take into consideration the countries which are 
homogeneous from a structural point of view. In reality, the EMU members display 
various and important structural heterogeneities (different sector structures, 
heterogeneities in terms of financial structures and at the level of the national labour 
market organization1). With the gradual enlargement of the Euro zone, these 
heterogeneities will become even more significant and will therefore influence the 
mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilization.  
Under these circumstances, we consider that the structural heterogeneity of 
the Union affects the labour market flexibility and we will study the efficiency in 
terms of macroeconomic stabilization of two fiscal policy games liable to take place 
between governments, i.e. Nash equilibrium and fiscal coordination. More precisely, 
we will make a distinction between shocks according to their type and origin and 
will analyse whether the fiscal coordination can improve the national welfare of 
each country member in comparison with a non cooperative game between 
governments. 
The first section of the paper presents the model that we have used and the 
reaction functions of public authorities (Central bank and national governments). 
The second section assesses, by means of numerical simulations, the relative 
efficiency of the fiscal coordination compared to a non cooperative game between 
national governments in terms of stabilization of the different economic shocks. The 
final section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We use a static Keynesian model within a closed Monetary Union with two 
countries ( i , j ). The macroeconomic equilibria are described by demand and supply 
functions and we consider that the heterogeneity of the Union concerns the labour 
market flexibility. All the variables (except the interest rate) are expressed in 
logarithms. Thus the demand function is represented by a standard IS function, often 
used in the literature: 
d
iji
d
i rbgagy εδ +−+=                          10 << a ;   1<b  ; 0>δ                    (1) 
where diy  and ig  are the output (as deviation from the natural output) and the 
budget deficit respectively of country i ; jg  represents the budget deficit of the 
                                                 
1
 See Cadiou et al. (1999), Kaiser (2005), Mojon and Peersman (2001), Penot et al. (2000), 
Van Els et al. (2001) for a review of the literature. 
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country j ; r  – the short-term interest rate; diε  the demand shock specific to the 
country i  with zero mean and finite variance 2d
iε
σ . 
The national demand of the country i  depends positively on the national 
budget deficit according to a sensitivity bellow the unit ( 1<a ) because of the 
crowding out effect, and depends negatively on the interest rate according to 
sensitivityδ . At the same time, the national output of the country i  is influenced by 
the budget deficit of the other Union member in a proportion b . The sign of the 
parameter b  can be positive or negative according to whether it is the output 
channel or the common exchange rate channel respectively that plays the major part 
in the transmission of the fiscal spillovers. Finally, the national output is influenced 
by a specific demand shock. 
As regards the supply equation, the production ( siy ) is described by a 
“Lucas supply” function augmented by the imported inflation. We consider that the 
expected inflation is zero as we are only investigating the issue of the 
macroeconomic stabilization and therefore leave aside any question of credibility.  
s
iiiii
s
i sy εππµπµ +−−= )(       0>iµ , 0>s                                                 (2) 
where π  and iπ  are the average inflation of the Union and the inflation of the 
country i  respectively; siε  – a supply shock specific to the country i  with zero 
mean and finite variance ( 2s
iε
σ ). 
The coefficient µ  measures the degree of labour market flexibility 
(Beetsma, Debrun and Klaassen, 2001 and Buti, Roeger and In’t Veld, 2001). If we 
represent the degree of heterogeneity between countries by a coefficient k  
( 10 << k ), then µµ )1( ki +=  and µµ )1( kj −= , where µ  stands for the 
average sensitivity of production to the price evolution. Therefore, if 0=k , the 
countries will be perfectly homogeneous in terms of labour market flexibility 
( ji µµ = ), whereas, if 1=k , the heterogeneity between the two countries reaches 
its maximum degree, as the price dynamics influences exclusively and with a 
maximum impact the national production of the country i  ( µµ 2=i  and 0=jµ ). 
For any variable x , we have defined the aggregate component 
2/)( ji xxx +=  (which represents the symmetric component of the variable x ) and 
the difference component 2/)( ji xxx −=  (which represents the asymmetric 
component of the variable x ). Regarding shocks, we consider θε  et θε  which 
stands for symmetric and asymmetric shocks respectively, where sd   ,=θ . 
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Having described the macroeconomic equilibria we will now analyse the 
behaviour of the policymakers. The Central bank decides on the single monetary 
policy using its interest rate as a policy instrument to achieve its objectives. The 
Central bank is mainly interested in price stabilization (with a weight 0β ), but also 
in output stabilization (with a weight 1β ) and in interest rate smoothing (with a 
weight 2β ).2  
[ ]2221202
1
ryLM ββπβ ++=  where      ( )1 ; 0  ,  , 210 ∈βββ                              (3) 
The governments are in charge with the implementation of the fiscal policies 
using the budget deficit as a policy instrument. Their aim is to minimize a loss 
function ( GiL ) which depends on the evolution of national economic activity and 
national budget deficit (the relative weight of these objectives are 0α , 1α ). We 
consider that the governments are not interested in price stabilization. Indeed, within 
the Euro zone, the governments’ reaction in order to stabilize the activity and prices 
is considerably restricted by the measures of the Stability and Growth Pact, whereas 
the ECB’s main objective is the stabilization of inflation. Consequently, we can infer 
that the fiscal authorities will take a greater interest in stabilizing the output than in 
stabilizing the prices. Moreover, we have considered that the imported inflation 
influences the national prices’ evolution (see equation 2) and thus weakens ever 
more the governments’ capacity to maintain the price stabilization.  
[ ]21202
1
ii
G
i gyL αα +=         ( )1 ; 0  , 10 ∈αα                                                         (4) 
Besides the Central bank’s and the governments’ loss functions, we also 
build a social loss function defined at the national level for each country of the 
Union. It depends on the national variables of the output and inflation (their relative 
weights being S0α  and 
S
1α  respectively). This function will allow us to compare the 
effectiveness in terms of macroeconomic stabilization of the Nash equilibrium 
relative to the fiscal coordination game. 
[ ]21202
1
i
S
i
SS
i yL παα +=    ( )1 ; 0  , 10 ∈SS αα                                                            (5) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The target values of the macroeconomic variables in the policymakers’ loss functions are 
normalized to zero. 
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3. The Analysis of the Model 
We consider Nash equilibrium between national governments and the 
Central Bank. The first stage in solving the model is to identify the optimal 
decisions of public authorities, which can minimize their loss functions. The interest 
rate writes as: 
( ) ( )[ ][ ]ssdd gbakgbazr εεεθε
δ
+−+−−++= )()(1                                      (6) 
where   
2
2
1
2
0
1
2
0
δ
β
βηβ
βηβ
++
+
=z         
2
2
1
2
0
2
0
δ
β
βηβ
ηβ
θ
++
=       and     )1(
1
2k−
=
µ
η  
The reaction function of the governments depends on the type of game 
developed between them. 
 
3.1 Nash Equilibrium 
In this case, there is an utter lack of coordination between governments, each of 
them aiming at minimizing its own loss function. The aggregate and difference 
component of public deficit are: 
 )(
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−=  
Using the equations (6) and (7), the equilibrium values of the public deficit and 
the interest rate become: 

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Where )1)((01 zbaaDN −++= αα ; )(01' baaDN −+= αα  and    
)(01 baaD ++= αα  
(8) 
 
(7) 
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The equations (8) allow us to seize the difference between the public 
authorities’ responses according to the type of economic shocks. Thus, the efforts 
made by the governments and the Central Bank in order to stabilize the symmetric 
demand shocks converge. For instance, in the case of a negative demand shock, the 
authorities will adopt an expansionary policy; the public deficit will rise while the 
interest rate will go down in order to encourage the demand and to boost the activity. 
On the contrary, when it comes to the supply shocks, the authorities’ reactions 
diverge. Indeed, these shocks hit directly only the inflation, causing the Central 
Bank to react as it is the only one interested in this objective. As a consequence of 
this reaction which affects the output, the governments will respond because they 
are concerned with bringing the economic activity at the equilibrium level again.  
The aggregate and difference components of the output and the inflation are: 
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3.2 Fiscal Coordination 
In this configuration the governments cooperate and the collective loss 
function will correspond to the sum of all the national loss functions: 
[ ])()(
2
1 22
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The aggregate and difference components of the output and the inflation 
are : 
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where )1()( 201 zbaDC −++= αα        ;       201' )(  baDC −+= αα
 
Taking into account the aggregate and difference components of the output 
and inflation, we can identify the equilibrium values of these macroeconomic 
variables at the national level according to the type of fiscal game configuration. If 
we consider C  N,  =φ  as the two games liable to take place between the 
governments, i.e. the Nash equilibrium and the fiscal coordination, any national 
variable ix  will be written according to the demand and supply shocks specific to 
the two Union members i  and j : ) , , ,( sjsidjdii fX εεεεφφ = . By means of these 
national equations, we will be able to conceive the social loss functions for each 
country and to compare the relative efficiency of the two fiscal games in terms of 
macroeconomic stabilization3.  
In order to study analytically the impact the Union’s heterogeneity degree has 
on the national stabilization mechanisms, we will make a double distinction between 
the stabilization of output and inflation, on the one hand, and between the type and 
origin of the shocks on the other hand. In the case of output stabilization, we point 
out firstly that the effectiveness of output stabilization for the country j  against its 
own demand shocks improves if the Union’s heterogeneity rises ( 0<








∂
∂
d
j
k
y j
ε
φ
). 
Secondly, in the case of supply shocks specific to the country j , if k  increases (rise 
of the structural heterogeneity between the Union members) the impact of this kind 
of shocks on the national output of all the Union members will also rises 
( 0, >








∂
∂
o
j
k
y ji
ε
φ
). 
These evolutions are the direct consequence of the different influences of the 
two countries on the aggregate inflation at the Union level. Indeed, if k  rises, the 
labour market of the country i  becomes more flexible than the labour market of its 
partner j  and the latter’s weight is thus more important in fixing the aggregate 
inflation at the Union level (see equation 2). Under these circumstances, the Central 
bank will develop a relatively more reactive monetary policy in order to stabilize the 
shocks specific to the country j  to the detriment of the shocks specific to the 
country i . Thus, for the country j ’s specific shocks, a reinforced monetary policy 
action will have different effects on the output stabilization according to the type of 
shocks: it will improve the output stabilization in the case of the demand shocks 
(due to the convergent efforts of stabilization developed by the Central bank and the 
                                                 
3
 The full expressions of the social loss functions at the national level are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
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governments of the countries affected by these shocks), it will worsen the output 
stabilization for the supply shocks (this kind of shocks are transmitted to the output 
by the monetary policy channel). 
On the contrary, in the case of shocks specific to the country i , the impact of 
the Union’s heterogeneity evolution degree on the national output is not clear-cut 
because the national governments can make up in some measure for the lack of 
monetary policy reaction generated by the increase of k . Indeed, a variation of k  
causes a re-adjustment in the monetary policy decision process which generates a 
response from the national governments. Nevertheless, if the Central bank is mainly 
interested in price stabilization ( 0β  high), the governments’ responses aren’t able to 
overweigh the effects of a particularly active monetary policy ( 0β  being high, 2β  
will be weak which implies that the Central bank has very large autonomy in using 
its interest rate). Thus, following a rise in k , the country i  specific shocks bring 
about the opposite effects relatively to country j  specific shocks: a worsening of 
the national output stabilization against the demand shocks ( 0>





∂
∂
d
i
k
yi
ε
φ
), a 
improvement of output stabilization for all the Union members against the supply 
shocks ( 0, <








∂
∂
o
i
k
y ji
ε
φ
). 
There is some ambiguity as to the way in which the evolution of the degree of 
the Union’s heterogeneity may influence the stabilization of output against the non 
specific demand shocks. The reason is that the mechanisms involved here may have 
contradictory effects: the foreign fiscal policies (the fiscal policies adopted in the 
countries where the shocks appear) together with the single monetary policy can 
neutralize the impact of the national fiscal policies. 
The analysis of the way in which the degree of structural heterogeneity 
influences the efficiency of shock neutralization is again hindered when dealing with 
the inflation stabilization. The reason is that the heterogeneity of the market 
flexibility generates a divergence between the inflation and output stabilization 
mechanisms. For instance, in the case of the demand shocks specific to the country 
j , a rise of k  ensures a better national output stabilization but it also triggers a 
growing influence of economic activity on national inflation. Under these 
circumstances, this more fluid transmission of the economic activity on national 
inflation can overweight, at the level of inflation stabilisation, the better results 
obtained in terms of output stabilization.  
Since no analytical solution is available to account for all the mechanisms of 
macroeconomic stabilization against the different types of shocks at the national 
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level, we need to make use of numerical simulation4 techniques. They will mainly 
enable us to analyse the relative efficiency of the fiscal coordination game relative to 
the Nash equilibrium by comparing the values of the national social loss functions 
resulting from these two fiscal game configurations. 
In order to compare the macroeconomic efficiency at the national level, we 
have distinguished between the economic shocks according to their type – demand 
and supply shocks – and to their origin – shocks specific to the country i  or j . The 
Figures bellow describes the evolution of the differences between the national social 
losses obtained in the Nash equilibrium relatively to the fiscal coordination game. 
The evolution of the national social loss’s differences5 takes into account the 
evolution of the structural heterogeneity degree between the countries ( k ) and the 
sign of the fiscal spillovers ( 0>b  or 0<b ). 
Figure 1: Demand shocks specific to the country i  – relative impact on the 
national welfare 
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4
 The simulations were developed using a numerical calibration that is presented in Appendix 
2.  
5
 The national social losses are developed according to the hypothesis of the independence 
between the different types of economic shocks. 
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Figure 2: Demand shocks specific to the country j  – relative impact on the 
national welfare 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
Structural heterogeneity (k)
Nash vs Coordination (b>0)
country i
country j
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Structural heterogeneity (k)
Nash vs Coordination (b<0)
country i
country j
 
European Research Studies, Volume XII, Issue (3), 2009 
 
50
  
In the case of the demand shocks specific to the country i , in order to 
achieve the best stabilization, the two countries need in general two different game 
configurations: fiscal coordination for the country i  ( )( )( )()( SiNSiC didi LELE σσ <  and 
lack of coordination for its partner j  ( )( )( )()( SjCSjN didi LELE σσ < , irrespectively of 
the sign of the fiscal spillovers ( 0>b  or 0<b ). There is only one exception 
concerning these stabilization mechanisms in the case where high structural 
heterogeneity ( 9,0=k ) is associated with positive fiscal spillovers ( 0>b ). The 
Nash equilibrium will then succeed in maximizing the quality of stabilization for the 
country i  as well, thus becoming the common optimum solution to both Union 
members. 
In the case of the demand shocks specific to the country j , the same general 
conditions of stabilization apply: the fiscal coordination provides the best 
stabilization for this country ( )( )( )()( SjNSjC djdj LELE σσ < , whereas the country i  
prefers a Nash equilibrium ( )( )( )()( SiCSiN djdj LELE σσ < ). Identifying the optimum 
solution common to both countries is dependent on a very high level of the structural 
heterogeneity between the countries ( 9,0=k ), just as in the previous case. This 
solution will have to take into account the sign of the fiscal spillovers and may be 
either the Nash equilibrium between governments if 0>b  or fiscal coordination if 
0<b . 
In general, except the case of a strong structural heterogeneity between 
countries, the specific demand shocks require a fiscal coordination game, while the 
non specific shocks are better stabilized by a Nash equilibrium between 
governments. In other words, in the case of the demand shocks if the Union’s level 
of structural heterogeneity is not excessively high, the two countries have different 
needs in terms of fiscal policy games that can converge only if the Union members 
display a very high level of structural heterogeneity. In this case, the Nash 
equilibrium provides the best stabilization for both countries if the fiscal spillovers 
are positive ( 0>b ), whereas if the fiscal spillovers are negative ( 0<b ), the fiscal 
coordination game becomes the best common solution for stabilizing the demand 
shocks specific only to the country j . 
We need to underline the robustness of these results which are not 
qualitatively changed by the use of different degrees of sensitivity of the public 
authorities to the evolution of the macroeconomic variables6. We can therefore 
                                                 
6
 For instance, when the monetary policy is at the same time more flexible and more 
sensitive to the Union’s aggregate price evolution ( 1,0  ;3,0  ;7,0 210 === βββ ) or 
when the fiscal policies are less flexible and thus less apt to neutralize the demand and 
supply shocks ( 5,0  ;5,0 10 == αα ). 
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conclude that except the case of a very high degree of structural heterogeneity 
between the Union members, the stabilization of the demand shocks generates a 
system blockage at the national level because there isn’t a single common solution 
which could ensure an optimum welfare for both Union members simultaneously. 
 
Figure 3: Supply shocks specific to the country i  – relative impact on the 
national welfare 
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Figure 4: Supply shocks specific to the country j  – relative impact on the 
national welfare 
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In the case of the supply shocks, the sign of the fiscal spillovers becomes 
more important as a criterion of differentiating the quality of stabilization than in the 
case of the demand shocks. Thus, if 0>b  the Nash equilibrium between 
governments is the best solution for both countries irrespectively of the origin of the 
supply shocks (specific to the country i or j )7 on condition that the structural 
heterogeneity is not very high ( 7,0<k ): )( )( )(,)(, )()(
S
ji
CS
ji
N
s
ji
s
ji
LELE
σσ
< . On the 
contrary, if the structural heterogeneity is high ( 7,0>k ), the system blocks because 
while the specific supply shocks are better stabilized by the Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
7
 For the supply shocks, the differences between the values of the social national losses in a 
Nash equilibrium in comparison with the fiscal coordination game are very low especially if 
7,0<k , and whatever the sign of the fiscal spillovers ( 0>b  or 0<b ). To put it 
differently, for 7,0<k , the relative efficiency of either of the fiscal configurations is 
considerably low in comparison with the other. 
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( )( )( ))(())(( )()(
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s
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LELE
σσ
< ), the non specific shocks are more successfully 
stabilized by the fiscal coordination between governments 
( )( )( ))(())(( )()(
S
ij
NS
ij
C
s
ji
s
ji
LELE
σσ
< ).  
If the fiscal spillovers are negative ( 0<b ), the same principles of 
stabilization apply except that the optimum solutions are reversed in comparison 
with the previous case. To put it clearly, the fiscal coordination is the optimum 
solution for both countries in stabilizing the supply shocks, whatever their origin, if 
the structural heterogeneity is situated bellow a threshold value ( 7,0<k ): 
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< . If the structural heterogeneity is higher than this 
threshold value ( 7,0>k ), the optimal common solution no longer works: the fiscal 
coordination optimizes the specific shocks stabilization 
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< ), but it is the Nash equilibrium which is the best 
solution to neutralize the impact of the non specific shocks 
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We should also notice that just as in the case of the demand shocks, these 
results are stable and remain unaffected by the different choices of parameters 
reflecting the public authorities’ preferences in building their specific loss functions. 
At the same time, we need to underline that the relative differences between national 
losses in the case of the supply shocks (the differences concern the loss functions 
between the Nash and fiscal coordination games) are less strong compared to the 
relative differences in the case of the demand shocks. This is explained by the 
discrepancy in the reactions of the public authorities (Central bank and national 
governments) concerning the stabilization of the supply shocks. Consequently, 
except the case of a very high degree of structural heterogeneity between the two 
Unions members, it is more likely to have a system blockage in the case of the 
demand shocks than to identify an optimum common solution (Nash equilibrium or 
fiscal coordination) for all the Union members in the case of the supply shocks. 
If we sum up the results, we notice a strong opposition between the 
mechanisms of stabilization of the demand and supply shocks, which doesn’t allow 
for an optimum solution common to both Union members and to both types of 
shocks (demand and supply shocks) simultaneously. Indeed, in the case of the 
demand shocks the optimum solution available for both countries simultaneously 
can be identified only if the Union displays a high structural heterogeneity 
( 8,0>k ). But for such a level of structural heterogeneity there is no optimum 
common solution available for the stabilization of the supply shocks. Given the 
incompatibility between the national stabilization mechanisms for the demand and 
supply shocks, and the lack of an optimum fiscal configuration for all the country 
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members, it may be necessary that the current system of economic governance be 
reformed. 
Table 1: Synthesis of results at national level 
Optimum solution in welfare terms 
Specific shocks Non Specific shocks 
Type 
of 
shocks 0>b  0<b  0>b  0<b  
Demand 
Fiscal 
coordination 
Nash equilibrium 
( 9,0=k ) 
Fiscal 
coordination 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Fiscal 
coordination 
( 9,0=k ) 
Supply Nash equilibrium 
Fiscal 
coordination 
 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Fiscal 
coordination 
( 7,0>k ) 
Fiscal 
coordination 
Nash 
equilibrium 
( 7,0>k ) 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have aimed at investigating the relative advantages of two 
fiscal policy games, i.e. the Nash equilibrium and the fiscal coordination, as 
institutional instruments providing the neutralization of the economic shocks in a 
heterogeneous Monetary Union. Considering the heterogeneity of the Union with 
respect to the national labour market flexibility, we have distinguished between 
shocks according to their type and origin, and raised the question whether the fiscal 
coordination can improve the national welfare of each Union country member in 
comparison to a non cooperative fiscal game between national governments. 
To sum up our results, we can underline the key elements that influence the 
mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilization. The main element is the type of shocks 
affecting the Union members. But the stabilisation mechanisms are also influenced 
by the sign of fiscal spillovers and by the extent of structural heterogeneity between 
Union’s members. In the case of the demand shocks, there is no single optimal 
solution for the two countries of the Union, irrespectively of the sign of the fiscal 
spillovers or of the various relative preferences of the public authorities. The 
specific shocks are better neutralized by a fiscal coordination game while the 
optimal absorption of the non specific shocks requires the absence of coordination 
between governments. On the contrary, if the structural heterogeneity of the Union 
is very strong, these results change: according to the origin of the demand shocks 
and to the sign of fiscal spillovers, the Nash equilibrium or secondarily the fiscal 
coordination become able to optimise the stabilization of the demand shocks 
simultaneously for the two Union members. 
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The analysis of the supply shocks yields opposite results in comparison with 
the case of the demand shocks. Thus, a high degree of structural heterogeneity 
triggers a robust blockage of the system at the national level, whereas for a weaker 
heterogeneity, the system can provide an optimum solution for both countries, 
whose nature is determined by the sign of the fiscal spillovers. 
To conclude, we may say that the optimum solution to the economic shocks 
affecting the countries of a heterogeneous Monetary Union requires different game 
configurations between the demand and supply shocks. As shown by our study, 
neither the Nash equilibrium between governments nor the fiscal coordination are 
capable of providing an overall efficient solution for all the Union members and for 
all the shocks whatever their type and origin. At the institutional level, this situation 
is critical because it causes an impass in terms of economical governance which may 
become problematic and undermine the coherence and credibility of the whole Euro 
zone. Consequently, the Euro zone needs to think about reforming its system of 
economic governance. We can suggest possible lines of reflection, as the idea of a 
more active coordination between the national fiscal policies on the one hand and 
the unique monetary policy, more sensitive to the national economic evolutions, on 
the other hand; or the idea of variable geometry fiscal coordination or of fiscal 
federalism. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
The national social loss functions for the Union’s countries 
We consider C  N,  =φ  as the two fiscal policy games liable to take place 
between governments i.e. Nash equilibrium and fiscal coordination. The social loss 
functions for the two countries of the Union which allow us to develop the 
numerical simulations are : 
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APPENDIX 2 
The numerical simulations have been obtained using the Matlab language. 
In order to analyse the quality of the national macroeconomic stabilization, we have 
studied the differences between the national losses resulting from the two game 
configurations in which the governments are involved (Nash equilibrium and fiscal 
coordination game). The relative differences have been calculated according to the 
evolution of the degree of structural heterogeneity between the countries ( k ). For 
the rest of the parameters, we have used a rich empirical and theoretical literature in 
order to choose the values that reflect the average of the Euro zone countries. 
For the sensitivity of the demand to the national deficit, we consider an 
average coefficient of 0,5 ( 5,0=a ), (Beetsma et al. (2001), Menguy (2005)). The 
value of fiscal spillovers has been established at 0,2 in absolute value ( 2,0=b ); we 
consider that the spillovers can’t be superior, in absolute value, to the sensitivity of 
the demand to the national public deficit ( ba > ). 
We use the sensitivity of the demand to interest rate as identified by Mojon 
and Peersman (2001) and by Van Els et al. (2001) with an average value of 0,2 for 
the Euro zone ( 2,0=δ ). Concerning the sensitivity of the production to the 
evolution of inflation, the coefficients used in the literature are generally situated 
around 3 et 4 (Van Aarle et al. (2002), Engwerda et al. (2002), Rogers (2001)); we 
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have thus chosen the value 3 for this coefficient ( 3=µ ). The sensitivity of the 
national inflation to foreign inflation is 0,2 ( 2,0=s ) as in Creel (2002). 
When identifying the relative preferences of the Central bank, we took into 
account the ECB’s main objective that is price stabilization. Consequently, the 
relative importance of this objective ( 5,00 =β ) is higher than the weight of the 
output stabilization ( 3,01 =β ) and of the interest rate smoothing ( 2,02 =β ). As to 
the national governments, they slightly favour the output stabilization 6,0
0
=α  
relative to the public deficit stabilization ( 4,0
1
=α ). As for the national social 
preferences, we consider a perfect equilibrium between the objectives of output and 
inflation stabilization ( 5,0
10
== SS αα ).  
The values of the model’s parameters are summed up in the Table bellow: 
 
Table 2: Calibration of the model’s parameters 
a b δ  µ  s  0β  1β  2β  0α  1α  
S
0α  
S
1α  
0,5 +/-0,2 0,2 3 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,5 
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